Prática de Shadowing: Carricks Tactics Didn't Work - What Went Wrong? | Manchester United vs Hull City - Aprenda a falar inglês com vídeo

This is what Hull's attack distribution looked like, and it's one of the reasons they were able to cause United so many defensive problems, despite having just 29% of the ball.

Losing to a promoted side is a horrific result, but we did get a closer look at what Carrick might

be looking to do with his attacking tactics as United did dominate the ball.

So we'll examine both sides of United's play.

When it comes to analysis, there's a lot of talk about formations, about how they're the most important thing, or they don't matter at all.

When more often than not, the answer is, it depends on the context.

In this encounter, Shaikh did play a part, as United both deep and high up the pitch were looking to defend in a 4-4-2, with Fernandes alongside Cunha.

And where you might have expected the Red Devils to come out guns blazing and trying to press high up the pitch, United were actually trying to do the exact opposite.

And whenever possible, they tried to remain solid, using their front two to tie up Howell's pivots, and giving their own pivots the freedom to patrol this area.

But Hull were great at baiting the press, holding onto the ball until United were forced to come towards them.

And here's where shape comes into it, as deeper on the pitch, Hull could form a back three with the goalkeeper being the third man, but more often it was the traditional back three in their 3-4-3 shape,

and this directly impacted United's wingers.

See if the front two were dragged into the press high up, but the midfield force stayed put, it would be far too easy for one of the widest centre backs to be the outlet and move up the pitch.

So not only did the United pivots have to back up the press, the ball side winger had to make a decision on whether to press or not.

And initially, in the case of Dorgou, the decision was to press, leaving the reds effectively in a lopsided 4-3-3.

But with their pivots tied up here and unable to assist out wide, it could lead to disastrous defensive situations,

as the Hull wing back could now receive with space as well as numbers ahead of him.

Here's the perfect example, United trying to hold a mid-blog, but Dorgou being drawn in on the press.

This time it's the midfielder who's rotated into a wing-back position, but the result is the same.

Time on the board to play up the pitch and then progress the team.

And within two passes, Hull are in the final third, and eventually this leads to a dangerous cross.

And this wasn't a one-off, and having been stung once, Dorgoo could find himself in no man's land like here, beginning to be drawn towards the third man, but at the same time knowing he's leaving Shaw at risk.

And though the pass doesn't come off, you can see the risk we're talking about, as Shaw is potentially two versus one down against the wingback and the attacking midfielder,

meaning Heaven is now drawn out of his more central position in order to compensate.

There are different ways with dealing with this build-up structure from a 4-4-2 base, besides just completely sitting off.

One of the most common is deliberately funneling the play into one direction.

So the front two would press strategically and use their pressing angles to cut out the play to the left for example, left for example, meaning that when Dorgue began to press, there's only one region the opposition could play into safely.

And because of those limited options, the wide area could actually function as a pressing trap, where the backline can then shift across and look to apply pressure onto the receiving wing back proactively,

rather than arriving a second late.

Alternatively, United could have looked to apply pressure earlier.

So in scenarios like this, one of the issues is that the wider centre back has time to receive and face the play before the pressure arrives.

Whereas imagine a scenario where the side has committed to pressing and Dorgou's press arrives as the man is receiving the ball.

It would be much harder for the wider centre-back to play

out as he hasn't had the time to look up and assess his passing options.

Comment down below any other ways you think they could have effectively handled this pressing problem.

But the bulk of the play came of course with United on the ball, and had told us a lot about Carrick's approach for the upcoming season.

Take a look at their average positions.

It's hard to discern much as it often is with their average positions, but in United's case, this was by design.

Initially, United were looking to build with back threes, in case Hull pressed with their front two, and this could be through either pivot dropping in, though for the most part it was Mizraoui tucking in early doors.

And United's approach against Hull's shape perfectly positioned them to take advantage of the wide areas and the central channels evenly.

And it all started and ended with United's desire for overload.

As much as possible, United, when higher up the pitch, would look to build with Santos as the solo pivot, which was made easier by Hull sitting deeper.

And crucially, with Shaw almost always pushing up outside of Dorgu in that first half, the winger would come infield.

Simultaneously, Tielemans pushed into the right-hand half space almost in line with the front two.

But when these inside players were pushed high, it was a lot easier for Hull to deal with the threat due to their back 5,

as the centre backs were relatively close to the attackers and were comfortable stepping out knowing that they had cover in behind.

United looked most dangerous when they shifted focus from overloading this final line to overloading the midfield line instead, which was made possible as they effectively operated with a double false 9,

as Cunha and Fernandes were always alternating positions, or both coming deep into these midfield regions.

And this was a theme throughout the 90s, as all of these central players were highly fluid, leading to those scattered average positions.

And this is where United's upgraded midfield will bear fruit over the season, as where last season it would have been Bruno here,

sacrificing his creativity, Santos and Tielemans in particular when they got on the ball, were able to thread these line breaking passes into the men between the lines,

as Hull struggled to deal with the sheer numbers in the central region.

Overload was exaggerated as United chased the match, with Masraoui now providing the width on the right hand side, allowing Mbumo to join the central overload.

And often times, with these two men preferring to drop deep, it was up to him or Dogu to occupy the centre backs and stop them from pushing out,

as dynamic runs in behind were crucial for United, as they weren't afraid to go more direct with their passes in behind.

The result was not just multiple line breaking opportunities, but also a midfield that had close proximity in the central zone.

And having so many players close together unlocks the potential for combinations, and we saw United were able to get into threatening positions like this repeatedly, but just couldn't make it count.

And naturally, the overloads forced Hull to defend more compactly, mainly in a 5-4-1.

And we saw United look to immediately switch to wide overloads, particularly down the right, again with the likes of Tielemans pushing into the wider regions.

And Harle would have to drag their midfield across to deal with the threat.

And here is where the dynamism of Dorgu came in handy, as despite Harle having a back 5 that could cover the entirety of the width,

his arrowing runs meant the right wing back often found himself being sucked narrow, leaving space out wide for sure to receive the switch.

And we saw Karik's other pillar come to the fore, as constant box overloads meant that the fullback always had men to hit, usually at least 4 crashing the box,

and again, plenty of dangerous situations emerged that just weren't maximized.

And despite the second half changes, the general strategy from Karik remained the same, and On a different day, perhaps it would have paid off, but today they scored none off almost 2xG.

Just before my final thoughts, it's a new season and the perfect time to up your tactical knowledge.

If that sounds good, check out Football Fundamentals down in the description, which is my free 30 day program designed to teach you the fundamentals of tactical analysis.

It's fair to say this was far from an ideal start from United, but I thought in possession there were positive signs for what might come further down the line, as the side continues to gel.

I'm curious whether you agree, and what you made of Carrickside in the first game of the season.

If you enjoyed this video, check out this one, examining the tactics of every post-Ferguson Manchester United manager.

And don't forget to check out Football Fundamentals to up your tactical understanding ahead of the new season.

Thank you.

O que é a Técnica de Shadowing?

Shadowing é uma técnica de aprendizado de idiomas com base científica, originalmente desenvolvida para o treinamento de intérpretes profissionais. O método é simples, mas poderoso: você ouve áudio em inglês nativo e repete imediatamente em voz alta — como uma sombra seguindo o falante com 1-2 segundos de atraso. Pesquisas mostram melhora significativa na precisão da pronúncia, entonação, ritmo, sons conectados, compreensão auditiva e fluência na fala.

Prática de Shadowing: Carricks Tactics Didn't Work - What Went Wrong? | Manchester United vs Hull City - Aprenda a falar inglês com vídeo

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O que é a Técnica de Shadowing?